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TIES THAT BIND? THE QUESTIONABLE CONSENT 
JUSTIFICATION FOR HOSANNA-TABOR† 
Jessie Hill 
ABSTRACT—Arguments in favor of religious sovereignty often emphasize 
the benefits of autonomy for religious institutions while ignoring the civil 
rights of individuals who belong to or work for those institutions. To justify 
intrusions on individual civil rights, proponents of strong religious 
autonomy generally rely on the concept of implied consent. According to 
this rationale, individuals willingly give up the protection of civil rights 
laws when they voluntarily join religious organizations. This Essay 
responds to one scholar’s account of the consent rationale as undergirding 
the Supreme Court’s recognition of the ministerial exception: Christopher 
Lund’s excellent article, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits 
of Hosanna-Tabor. Although Lund skillfully sketches out a comprehensive 
framework for understanding when and to what extent government can 
regulate religious entities through civil law, the consent rationale itself is 
profoundly troubling. First, church members may face practical difficulties 
in exiting their religious affiliation, such as substantial pressures not to 
withdraw, and severe but informal sanctions if they do. Second, the view of 
religion as voluntaristic is a distinctly Protestant, not universal, 
understanding of religious faith. Finally, even if they consent to join and 
remain in a religious community, members may not have notice of the 
doctrines to which they have supposedly consented because the church’s 
stance may be unclear or changing. As a result, it is not always easy to 
identify who is the dissenter in a religious organization and who speaks for 
the church. Thus, if religious autonomy’s intrusion on individual rights is to 
be justified, it must be on grounds other than consent.  
 
AUTHOR—Ben C. Green Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty 
Development and Research, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law. Some of the arguments in this essay were first presented at the 
Conference on the New Religious Institutionalism at DePaul University 
College of Law. Many thanks to the participants of that conference for 
comments and suggestions, especially Susan Bandes, Rick Garnett, Zoë 
Robinson, and Micah Schwartzman. Thanks also to Chris Lund.   
 
† This Essay was originally published in the Northwestern University Law Review Online on 
November 19, 2014, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 91 (2014), http://www.northwesternlawreview.org/
online/ties-bind-questionable-consent-justification-hosanna-tabor [http://perma.cc/ZFC5-PVBY]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Christopher Lund’s article, Free Exercise Reconceived: The 
Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor,1 identifies an eminently sensible 
settlement over the contentious issue of when and to what extent the 
government can regulate church employment and participation issues that 
touch on public laws. The settlement includes a zone of protection for 
church autonomy, grounded in Free Exercise and Establishment Clause 
principles, which can be overcome only where churches have asked for or 
waived their rights to refuse state involvement. This bargain carefully 
balances the interests of churches as independent rights-bearing entities 
against those of the state. But it is problematic in one very important way. 
It does not justify forcing individuals—who are purportedly bound by 
church norms as a function of their membership—to forfeit their ability to 
assert their legal rights simply because a matter is deemed “religious.” 
Lund’s particular line of reasoning focuses on protecting religious 
organizations from the state but fails to provide a persuasive rationale for 
denying individuals the protection of the law. 
Consent and voluntariness are central to Lund’s article. For example, 
Lund explains that a church’s right to autonomy derives from the individual 
free exercise right, which is itself grounded in consent and voluntariness.2 
The bedrock principle of First Amendment doctrine is that “[n]o one gets to 
control another person’s religious conduct; no one has the right to force his 
religion on someone else.”3 This simple rule then helps to explain why 
churches need not listen to dissenters and may continue to enforce their 
own rules in the face of contrary internal claims; to allow dissenters to win 
would be to allow them to control the group members’ religious exercise.4 
 
1 Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 
108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183 (2014). 
2 See id. at 1197. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 1198. 
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The lynchpin here is evidently consent. Because no one can force the 
dissenters to become or remain members of the church, it follows that no 
one can be forced to worship with anyone who does not share her beliefs.5 
Moreover, if anyone has the right to exit the church at any time, members 
can be understood to have submitted to the church’s rules rather than those 
of civil society—at least on issues touching on religious doctrine or internal 
church governance.6 Indeed, Lund repeatedly grants “constitutional” status 
to the concept of consent in supporting autonomy for churches from certain 
externally imposed requirements, such as employment discrimination laws, 
in intrachurch disputes.7 Consent is the crucial element that allows church 
rules to be binding on their members when they conflict with legal rules, 
especially in cases sounding in employment discrimination, labor, or tort.8 
Nonmembers, those who have not consented to the church’s authority, are 
not so bound. 
Of course, Lund is not the only one to rely on members’ consent to 
play by the rules of their church as a basis for granting churches a degree of 
autonomy from secular regulation. The consent rationale for affording 
churches autonomy from legal regulation is a venerable one. Indeed, the 
concept of voluntariness is in many ways central to the American 
understanding of religion and of the religion clauses of the Constitution. As 
James Madison proclaimed in his influential Memorial and Remonstrance 
Against Religious Assessments, for example: 
“Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of 
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence.” The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and 
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these 
may dictate.9 
Madison’s conception of religious exercise is profoundly voluntaristic; 
individuals must be free to follow their own conscience where it leads them 
and cannot be forced into any particular system of belief or religious 
conduct. As it has long been understood, the freedom of religion thus 
includes not only the right to exercise the religion of one’s choice, but also 
 
5 See id. at 1203. 
6 Id. (discussing the “constitutional right to exit” and the distinction between internal and external 
matters). 
7 Id. at 1195 (using the term “constitutional” and “constitutionalized” in connection with the 
consensual nature of church–employee relations). 
8 Id. at 1203. 
9 See JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON ¶ 1, at 184 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1901) (quoting VA. 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XVI (1776)). For another critique of the consent rationale, see Richard 
Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917, 957–62 
(2013). 
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the right to change or to leave one’s religion, as well as to exercise no 
religion at all.10 
However, consent also plays a central role in Lund’s argument in a 
second, more innovative way. Lund argues that churches should, within 
limits, be free to exercise autonomy with respect to “imposed” legal 
obligations, such as the prohibition against child abuse or workplace safety 
rules, but not with respect to “assumed” legal obligations, such as those 
that arise from entering into contractual, property, or corporate 
transactions.11 The rationale for this distinction is again based on consent. 
With respect to “assumed (or voluntary) legal obligations[,] . . .  [t]he 
parties assume the duties created . . . : they choose to enter into contracts, 
trusts, and corporate arrangements.”12 Because of the voluntary nature of 
such transactions, churches can decide to order their affairs so as to 
anticipate, avoid, or even selectively submit for judicial resolution any 
future disputes that may arise; if they fail to do so, they must be understood 
to have agreed to civil society’s intervention.13 By contrast, in the case of 
imposed legal obligations, churches have no choice in the matter so they 
should have greater freedom to order their own affairs, at least where 
litigation threatens to affect the church’s religious beliefs or practices.14 
Law’s intrusion is greatest where the church neither consented to its 
intervention nor had the ability to arrange its own affairs so as to avoid 
inviting the intrusion. 
Consent (or voluntariness) therefore dictates the extent to which civil 
society can interfere in church affairs. In other words, it can intrude on 
intrachurch disputes only to the extent that the church can be understood to 
have invited that intrusion through its own voluntary assumption of legal 
(contractual or property-based) obligations. And indeed, Lund spends much 
of his article expressing concern that, because of problems of legal intent 
and of “dead hands,” the degree of legal intervention into church affairs 
will not perfectly reflect the extent to which the church has truly, 
intentionally, and voluntarily invited that intervention.15 
While Lund’s consent rationale is nuanced and thoughtful, it does not 
adequately take account of the individuals whose interests are also at stake. 
First, the consent rationale does not appear to recognize that believers’ 
relationships with their religious institutions are not always entirely 
consensual in nature. Rather, those relationships may be shaped by various 
 
10 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 197 
(1992) (discussing the implied right to embrace no religion as a corollary of religious freedom). 
11 Lund, supra note 1, at 1201, 1220. 
12 Id. at 1200 (emphasis added). 
13 Id. at 1220–22. 
14 Id. at 1202–03, 1220. 
15 Id. at 1220–29. 
109:563 (2015) Ties that Bind? 
567 
kinds of pressure that are informal and subtle but nonetheless real and 
substantial. Second, the consent rationale is rooted in a particular Protestant 
worldview that is not universally shared by all religions. Third, individuals 
often have no meaningful way to determine exactly what they are 
consenting to when they affiliate with a given religion. Finally, it is often 
difficult to determine just who counts as an insider of a church and who 
gets to say exactly what that church’s doctrine actually is. This means that 
the consent rationale may justify why religious organizations deserve 
autonomy from the state but fails to justify why churches can deny their 
members and employees the protection of the law. 
I. THE PROBLEMATIC CONSENT RATIONALE 
A. The Power of Religious Affiliation 
There are several reasons to doubt the force of the consent rationale 
for refusing to vindicate the rights of individuals who are wronged by their 
churches. First, although Lund speaks of a constitutional right to exit any 
congregation, it may not always be the case that church membership is 
truly consensual: Jews mostly enter Judaism by birth; Catholics mostly 
become Catholics through infant baptism.16 Similarly, exit may not always 
be a meaningful option even if it is theoretically possible. People’s 
identities are often profoundly tied to their religious affiliations. For 
example, a Methodist minister who was recently suspended from the 
church for officiating at the wedding of his son to another man, after being 
asked whether he considered leaving the church because of its views on 
homosexuality, put it this way: 
It’s not as easy as that. . . . 
 I mean, it’s—that would be like, you know, if I were a homosexual and 
lived in a state that doesn’t allow for gay marriage, . . . I don’t uproot myself 
and take myself out of my family and my surrounding, my friends and go to 
another state. I try to stay put. I have roots in the state. 
 And that’s the same with the church. I mean, I’ve been a part of the 
Methodist Church for [twenty] years. I love this church, you know, except for 
this discriminatory law that we have. I love the church. . . .  
 
16 Cf., e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION 
DIVIDES AND UNITES US 136 (2010) (noting that approximately three-quarters of Americans identify 
with the religious tradition in which they were raised, though not all of those actively practice); PETER 
W. WILLIAMS, AMERICA’S RELIGIONS: FROM THEIR ORIGINS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 59 (2d 
ed. 2002) (noting that infant baptism is the norm in Roman Catholicism); EGON MAYER, BARRY A. 
KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, AMERICAN JEWISH IDENTITY SURVEY 2001, at 20 (2d ed. 2003), available 
at http://www.simpletoremember.com/vitals/ajisbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/NK3R-EXUG] (indicating 
that most religious Jews surveyed had at least one Jewish parent). 
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 You don’t just go and uproot yourself and your family out of a faith 
tradition.17 
Similarly, women working within the Roman Catholic Church to 
convince the hierarchy to accept the ordination of female priests would not 
remain Catholic if they did not feel a deep identification with the Catholic 
faith.18 They would simply join a congregation that matched their own 
beliefs more fully. 
Or take Stephen Daedalus, the Irish Catholic main character in James 
Joyce’s largely autobiographical novel A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man. Stephen refuses to take communion despite his dying mother’s plea 
that he do so.19 He has lost his faith and in particular no longer subscribes 
to the Catholic dogma of transubstantiation, which holds that the 
communion wafer is actually the body of Jesus Christ. Stephen’s friend 
Cranly questions this particularly cruel act of obstinacy: “What is it for 
you? You disbelieve in it. It is a form: nothing else. And you will set her 
mind at rest.”20 In other words, if the communion wafer is no more than a 
bit of unleavened bread to a nonbeliever, why shouldn’t he eat it, just to 
make his dying mother happy? Yet Stephen continues to resist, because he 
feels it would be somehow sacrilegious to take communion without 
believing in it. He is still Catholic, in spite of himself.21 
In addition, informal, but nonetheless real and anguishing, sanctions 
may ensue for those who make the decision to leave. For example, women 
in polygamist communities may not leave the community out of fear that 
they could lose custody of their children.22 It is not clear how such cases fit 
in with an understanding of religious membership that turns heavily on 
 
17 Jeremy Hobson, Same-Sex Marriage Roils Methodist Church, HERE & NOW (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2013/11/21/methodist-gay-marriage [http://perma.cc/9H4X-5C96]. 
18 For example, the organization of Roman Catholic Womenpriests, which claims the right to 
ordain women as priests contrary to the teachings of the church hierarchy, describes itself as an 
“international movement within the Roman Catholic Church” and insists that “[d]espite what some 
bishops may lead the faithful to believe, our ordinations are valid because we are ordained in apostolic 
succession within the Roman Catholic Church.” ROMAN CATHOLIC WOMENPRIESTS, 
http://www.romancatholicwomenpriests.org [http://perma.cc/5D8E-NLPM]. The desire of the group 
members to remain within the church and to be consistent with its doctrines is striking. Professor 
Madhavi Sunder has documented analogous movements by women in traditional Muslim communities 
to assert claims to sex equality within and through their religious communities, rather than on purely 
secular grounds. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1434–57 (2003). 
19 JAMES JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN 263 (Seamus Deane ed., Penguin 
Books 2003) (1916). 
20 Id. 
21 See id. at 265. Indeed, Cranly then asks Stephen whether he intends to become a Protestant 
(because Protestant doctrine does not include transubstantiation). Stephen replies (putting a rather fine 
point on it): “I said that I had lost the faith, . . . but not that I had lost selfrespect [sic].” Id. 
22 Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 2010 UTAH L. 
REV. 47, 59. 
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consent. Emotional anguish and loss of identity resulting from losing one’s 
religious community are not precisely the same as locking a Catholic priest 
in an asylum until he confesses his sins;23 they fit poorly with hypotheticals 
involving explicit grants or denials of consent.24 Yet, the voluntariness that 
supposedly ties individuals to their religious communities may often be 
illusory. 
B. Distinctly Protestant Roots 
Secondly and relatedly, it is important to recognize that the classic, 
liberal, voluntaristic conception of religion is itself an outgrowth of a 
particular Protestant theology and that it is not necessarily a universal 
approach to spirituality. The bedrock principle of voluntariness grows out 
of Protestant theology, not just Lockean liberalism.25 The Baptists, for 
example, were early advocates of both a highly voluntaristic approach to 
religion and the separation of church and state.26 Indeed, Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance itself may be viewed as a controversial and 
theologically charged document, in part due to its voluntaristic bent.27 
Many denominations are far less voluntaristic in their orientations than 
Protestantism, however.   
For example, as Professor Alan Brownstein points out, anti-Catholic 
sentiment in early America stemmed in part from an association of 
Catholicism with “religious tyranny”—a top-down approach to faith that 
required unthinking adherence to church authority and to one official 
interpretation of the Bible, which made it “inconsistent with core principles 
of religious liberty.”28 Of course, to characterize the Catholic Church in 
these terms today would be caricature; nonetheless, those raised in a 
traditional Catholic family can attest that there is very little that actually 
seems voluntary about the Catholic tradition.29 Other faith traditions, such 
as Mormonism and orthodox Judaism, require adherence to detailed codes 
of conduct, thus deemphasizing pure religious voluntarism, according to 
which individuals can choose their faith tradition as they choose their 
 
23 Lund, supra note 1, at 1218 (citing O’Moore v. Driscoll, 28 P.2d 438 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933)). 
24 See id. at 1202–03 (citing Doe v. Moe, 827 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)). 
25 Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to 
Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (2000). 
26 See, e.g., Mark S. Scarberry, John Leland and James Madison: Religious Influence on the 
Ratification of the Constitution and on the Proposal of the Bill of Rights, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 733 
passim (2009). 
27 Steven D. Smith, Blooming Confusion: Madison’s Mixed Legacy, 75 IND. L.J. 61, 66 (2000). 
28 Alan E. Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Religious Institutions, 21 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 201, 224–29 (2013). 
29 Cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 60, 63–66 (noting the nonconsensual and binding nature of 
certain Catholic doctrines and Catholicism’s perception as “overly rigid and spiritually deadening”). 
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universities or extracurricular activities.30 The picture of religious affiliation 
as purely consensual, while appealing, is thus far too simple. 
C. Consenting to What? 
There are other reasons to doubt that believers, in choosing to affiliate 
with particular communities, are consenting to the church’s jurisdiction 
rather than civil jurisdiction in cases of conflict. One is that consent is 
fairly meaningless if the consenter is not on notice of the actual terms of 
the agreement.31 Like their physical embodiments in the Church of St. John 
the Divine in New York or the Sagrada Familia in Barcelona, many 
religious faiths are perpetually under construction. To say simply that 
becoming a member of a religion means that an individual will accept 
whatever church authorities say the doctrine will be, no matter how novel, 
bizarre, or remote from the original doctrine, is an extreme, if not 
unrecognizable, understanding of implied consent. Of course, some readers 
may still feel that it would be fine, say, for the Catholic Church to suddenly 
reject the doctrine of transubstantiation in favor of consubstantiation and to 
put believers to the choice of either accepting the change or separating 
from the church. Civil courts would hardly be competent to judge the 
appropriateness of such a move. But if a church tells an employee that she 
has waived her right to nondiscrimination on the basis of sex by joining the 
church—even if the church’s official, stated doctrine does not require or 
permit sex discrimination—the reason for upholding the church’s right to 
do so certainly has nothing to do with consent as that term is commonly 
understood.32 
Indeed, Lund is concerned that sometimes churches may accidentally 
waive their rights to autonomy if the legal rules are vague or if churches 
make contracts with terms that they did not actually intend to be legally 
enforceable.33 But he worries much less about the individuals contracting 
with churches, who themselves may intend that their contract terms are 
legally enforceable or who may not understand the meaning of vague 
religious terms. The case of Christa Dias, a non-Catholic unmarried teacher 
at a Catholic school in Cincinnati who was fired when she informed her 
 
30 Id. at 392–95 (discussing the detailed requirements of Mormonism). 
31 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 5 cmt. a (1981) (“The terms of a promise or 
agreement are those expressed in the language of the parties or implied in fact from other conduct.”). 
32 Cf. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 300–05 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying the ministerial 
exception to bar a claim of sex discrimination and retaliation by a woman who had been appointed 
University Chaplain of a Catholic university and subsequently dismissed because of her gender); Egan 
v. Hamline United Methodist Church, 679 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (dismissing, on 
statutory grounds, suit by church music director for sexual orientation discrimination against a 
Methodist Church congregation that had an explicit policy against such discrimination). 
33 Lund, supra note 1, at 1222–24. 
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employer that she was pregnant, illustrates this point.34 Dias had signed an 
employment contract with the school requiring her to “comply with and act 
consistently in accordance with the stated philosophy and teaching of the 
Roman Catholic Church.”35 Because Catholicism condemns extramarital 
sex, Dias was fired for becoming pregnant while unmarried.36 Attempting 
to set the school officials straight, Dias informed them that she had become 
pregnant through artificial insemination, not sexual intercourse; they then 
informed her that assisted reproduction also violated Catholic principles—a 
fact of which she was apparently unaware.37 
It seems profoundly unlikely that a non-Catholic teacher hired by a 
Catholic school would know the details of Catholic doctrine, or understand 
exactly what she was agreeing to when she signed the vague “morals 
clause” in her contract. Of course, individuals are generally expected to 
read and understand the contracts they sign, but there must be some limits 
to this principle, especially with respect to amorphous and ambiguous 
terms. And indeed, a jury agreed with this view, awarding her $171,000 for 
pregnancy discrimination.38 Nonetheless, the church had tried to claim that 
the non-Catholic computer instructor was in fact a “minister” of the church 
and therefore subject to the ministerial exception.39 Thus, in the church’s 
view, someone who was not even a church member could be considered a 
minister and therefore an “insider” for purposes of subjecting her to the 
church’s rules and denying her the protection of the antidiscrimination 
laws. The notion of consent is complicated here, but Lund’s argument is 
unclear as to whether he would consider individuals like Dias to be 
religious and voluntary “insiders” or nonconsenting “outsiders.”40 
It is thus stretching the idea of consent past the breaking point to treat 
individuals as consenting to the church’s authority when they did not know 
that they were foregoing civil enforcement, were not aware of the rules to 
which they were agreeing, or did not intend to agree to all future rule 
changes, including the most unforeseeable. Of course, Lund acknowledges 
 
34 Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 
29, 2012). 
35 Id. at *1 n.1. 
36 Id. at *1. 
37 Id. 
38 Lisa Cornwell, Christa Dias, Ohio Mom, Awarded More than $170,000 for Discrimination, 
Cincinnati Catholic Archdiocese Expected to Appeal, HUFFINGTON POST (June 4, 2013, 6:54 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/04/christa-dias-mom-awarded-_n_3383022.html [http://perma. 
cc/EC2G-V7WM]. 
39 Dias, 2012 WL 1068165, at *3–5. 
40 Lund provides the example of children in Catholic schools suing over their expulsions and notes 
that “although [Catholic schools] educate many non-Catholic students, those students chose a Catholic 
school.” Lund, supra note 1, at 1203–04. Nonetheless, Lund states, “[T]his is a boundary question.” Id. 
at 1204. 
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that implied consent may not be the most accurate description, suggesting 
that “this is probably more analogous to assumption of risk.”41 Still, it is 
unclear how this observation affects the overall analysis or helps to justify 
church sovereignty over individuals. Though Lund finds waivers of church 
autonomy to be problematic when such factors are present, he does not 
worry about individuals’ waivers of their civil rights.42 
Take Lund’s example of Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. 
Schubert.43 In that case, a seventeen-year-old girl was twice held down by 
force and restrained for hours during religious youth group programs while 
she begged and pleaded to be freed, resulting in psychological trauma.44 
The Texas Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibited the 
trial court from deciding issues pertaining to emotional damages arising 
from the church’s practice, insofar as they would require the court to pass 
judgment on matters of internal church doctrine.45 In its reasoning, the court 
explicitly relied on the presence of consent, stating that “religious practices 
that might offend the rights or sensibilities of a non-believer outside the 
church are entitled to greater latitude when applied to an adherent within 
the church.”46 The court then proceeded to cite cases supporting the notion 
that consent grounds the immunity of churches from civil suits in some 
circumstances.47 
But at no point did the plaintiff’s young age enter into the Texas 
Supreme Court’s analysis. Commentators, including Lund, also tend to 
gloss over this fact.48 If anyone’s consent is relevant with respect to a minor 
child, it is the parents’. The parents may have consented in some 
 
41 Id. at 1200. Lund further acknowledges, “[I]t is true that implied consent is not consent, nor even 
a proxy for consent. Implied consent is a fiction used to operationalize the constitutional right of 
churches to have control over their own decisions.” Id. 
42 For example, Lund argues that even where assumed obligations are involved, a church’s ability 
to waive its sovereignty should be extremely limited and narrowly construed. He would essentially 
adopt a strong presumption in favor of nonintervention even in contract and property disputes, requiring 
an “explicit mention of judicial resolution” in the relevant documents before courts could adjudicate 
them. Id. at 1227. 
43 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
44 Id. at 3–4. 
45 Id. at 13. 
46 Id. at 12. 
47 Id. (citing Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Mich. 2000); Guinn v. 
Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 774 (Okla. 1989)). 
48 Lund, supra note 1, at 1217–1219; see, e.g., Cynthia Koploy, Note, Free Exorcise Clause? 
Whether Exorcism Can Survive the Supreme Court’s “Smith Neutrality,” 104 NW. U. L. REV. 363, 
382–84 (2010). But see Jeffrey Shulman, Who Owns the Soul of the Child?: An Essay on Religious 
Parenting Rights and the Enfranchisement of the Child, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 385, 440–44 (2012); 
Shari-Ann Harris, Note, “Lay a Hand on Me, Brother”: Why Definitional Balancing and Consent 
Doctrine Should Apply to the Religious False Imprisonment and Assault Claims in Pleasant Glade 
Assembly of God v. Schubert, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 406, 427–28 (2010). 
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generalized way to their daughter’s church membership and participation in 
the youth group event, but they did not know what exactly was taking 
place.49 Moreover, her father had specifically expressed concern to church 
officials when he learned what had taken place and the impact it had had on 
his daughter.50 If this incident of battery, assault, false imprisonment, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress can be justified by some form of 
voluntariness or consent by virtue of the fact that the victim was identified 
as a member of a particular church, then the term has simply been emptied 
of all its meaning.51 
II. INSIDERS, OUTSIDERS, AND RELIGIOUS EVOLUTION 
Finally, although it is easy enough to describe conflicts as playing out 
between “the church” and “dissenters,” it is not always so easy to say 
exactly who is which. Religious teachings and even religious identity itself 
are perpetually being disputed, reconsidered, and modified.52 With the 
exception of the Ten Commandments, most religious doctrines are not 
etched in stone. Indeed, it is probably the sign of a healthy, thriving church 
that such change can and does occur. If we as a society are interested in 
protecting and encouraging religious communities to flourish, it very well 
may be that allowing individuals to stay in their religious communities and 
work for change within those communities, or to stay despite dissenting on 
some issues, serves values that are just as important as allowing churches to 
refuse to associate with them. After all, what it means to be Roman 
Catholic (or Lutheran, or Wiccan) is itself often profoundly contested; we 
should not be too quick to assume that Catholicism or Lutheranism or 
Wiccanism is simply whatever “the church,” as some sort of monolith, says 
it is. 
Although the dynamic nature of religious institutions does not directly 
undermine the consent rationale, it does question it. The consent paradigm 
assumes that there is a static structure, set of beliefs, or code of conduct to 
which an outsider agrees upon becoming a member of a church. However, 
if the religious institution is not simply offering a predesigned package for 
consumption, but rather inviting participation in a community, then it is 
 
49 They were out of town during most of the events. Pleasant Glade, 264 S.W.3d at 3–4. 
50 Id. at 4. 
51 Lund agrees with me that the claims in Pleasant Glade should have gone to a jury, but only 
because it appears that Schubert herself may not have consented to the purported exorcism. Lund, supra 
note 1, at 1218. If she did consent, he maintains, then the claims should fail because she could “leave 
the church at any time.” Id. 
52 See Sunder, supra note 18, at 1402–03 (“[C]ontrary to law’s centuries-old conception, religious 
communities are internally contested, heterogeneous, and constantly evolving over time through 
internal debate and interaction with outsiders.”). 
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much less accurate to view church members as automatically agreeing, 
upon entry, to submit to the will of a supposedly dominant group. 
Examples abound. Women have been excommunicated from the 
Roman Catholic Church for ordaining women priests. Yet a recent New 
York Times–CBS News poll indicates that roughly seventy percent of 
Catholics believe the church should allow women to become priests.53 This 
is not to say that churches should be required to follow the will of a 
majority of their constituents, or that the courts should intervene in core 
religious disputes such as this one. But the example does point out that 
characterizing such intrachurch disputes as involving “dissenters” trying to 
vindicate their rights against “the church” is likely an oversimplification. 
Another example is Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church, in 
which a Methodist music director was hired by a church that had recently 
voted to be accepting of homosexuality and bisexuality and had an explicit 
policy forbidding sexual orientation discrimination.54 Egan was fired after 
he complained about a supervisor who had expressed homophobic views 
toward him.55 The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Egan’s claim 
could not go forward because the church was statutorily exempt from the 
state’s antidiscrimination laws and had not waived that exemption by 
adopting an explicit nondiscrimination policy based on sexual orientation.56 
The court noted that its reading was grounded in the “constitutional policy” 
of avoiding judicial involvement in matters of church governance.57 
Though there may have been good reasons for the court to decline to hear 
Egan’s claim for discrimination, it is obviously far too simple to 
characterize the dispute as one involving a dissenter against church 
authorities, because the plaintiff’s position actually reflected the church’s 
official view. 
Finally, courts and commentators often allude to church organization 
but rarely spend much time analyzing its importance in identifying 
dissenters. Some churches are congregational and some are hierarchical in 
structure. Perhaps the particular church structure should also affect how we 
think about cases involving the power of dissenting groups within a church. 
For example, supposed “dissenters” within congregational churches might 
have stronger claims than those in hierarchical churches because members 
of hierarchical churches have presumably agreed from the outset to a lower 
degree of participation in shaping their institutions. But the consent-based 
 
53 Laurie Goodstein & Megan Thee-Brenan, U.S. Catholics in Poll See a Church Out of Touch, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/us/poll-shows-disconnect-between-us-
catholics-and-church.html [http:// http://perma.cc/FD6F-SRV9]. 
54 679 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 356–59. 
57 Id. at 358. 
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approach seems to assume that, when an intrachurch dispute arises, the 
“church” as an undivided whole generally stands in opposition to its 
individual followers, whether the religious organization is congregational 
or hierarchical in nature. 
CONCLUSION 
The approach embodied in Lund’s persuasive and powerful article 
certainly has much to recommend it. It brings a large measure of analytic 
clarity to an area of First Amendment doctrine that sorely needs it. In 
addition, Lund has likely identified precisely which assumptions 
unconsciously motivate the courts in deciding to hear, or not to hear, 
intrachurch disputes. I argue here that, however accurate and insightful this 
approach may be as a descriptive matter, it is profoundly flawed as a 
normative matter to the extent that it relies on consent as the justification 
for requiring individuals to forego the protection of civil laws in all matters 
related to religious employment or participation. Of course, it may be the 
case that some measure of fairness and equality must be sacrificed in order 
for liberty to thrive. It is possible that the survival of religious associations 
requires a reduced level of participation by their members in civil society. 
And it may well be that this tradeoff is worth it in the end. But that is a case 
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